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Judith Mosoff* Reproductive Technology and
Disability: Searching for the
"Rights" and Wrongs in
Explanation
Several years ago I worked as a lawyer representing psychiatric patients
on the grounds of a large medieval-looking turn-of-the-century mental
hospital in British Columbia. Soon after starting my new job I met Ann,
a woman who shortly after her admission as an involuntary patient had
informed her treatment team that she was pregnant. She had always
wanted to have a baby. When she told her doctor about her pregnancy, he
decided that this idea was part of her delusional system and prescribed
anti-psychotic drugs to control her pathology. In fact she was pregnant
and the medication given during the first trimester of pregnancy had
teratogenic effects. Now she was carrying a fetus with a disability. The
doctors told her that it would be best to have an abortion in the circum-
stances. She agreed. This client began my thinking about disability,
reproduction, parenting and the role of medical control.
This paper is about women, disability and reproductive rights, specifi-
cally new reproductive technologies.1 The discussion examines the ways
that a "rights" analysis informs the position women with disabilities take
to reject new reproductive technology, particularly pre-natal testing. By
way of contrast, some women who define themselves as "reproductively
disabled" because of their difficulties in conceiving or bearing children
argue for their right of access to reproductive technology, especially
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, with thanks to Susan
Boyd, Christine Boyle, Nitya Duclos, Isabel Grant, Roberta Hamilton, Nancy Hansen, Susan
Russell, Jim Russell and Lynn Smith, all of whom read earlier drafts of this paper and made
helpful suggestions. This article is not to be quoted without the permission of the author.
1. I am using the distinction between old and new reproductive technologies that is outlined
by Renate Duelli Klein, "What's 'New' About the 'New' Reproductive Technologies" in G.
Corea, et. aL (eds),Man-Made Women, (London: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1985)
p. 64 where new reproductive technologies include pre- and post conception sex selection
techniques, the full range of 'test-tube' techniques, as well as the increasing number of
antenatal tests such as amniocentesis and chorionic villi sampling. However, as medical
intervention in women's reproduction increases, various older "technologies"-often those that
have been organized, if not controlled by women, for centuries-themselves seem "new"
because they are stamped with the approval of medical expertise. Abortion and birth control
are examples. Artificial insemination has traditionally been used by lesbians who wish to
become pregnant without engaging in heterosexual sex. It too is often considered "new" as it
becomes restricted through medicalization.
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in vitro fertilization (IVF).2 Arguments in support of each of these
divergent political positions rely on the concepts of "disability", "rights"
and "choice". How do the same principles lead to such different
conclusions?
My thesis is that women with disabilities bring a critical view to the
meaning of "choice" in reproductive rights, because of a heightened
sensitivity to group-based concerns and equality rights, rather than to the
situation of the individual case. The life experience of disability is
characterized by discrimination and presentation of false choices. The
disability community argues that the "choice" to continue with a particu-
lar pregnancy following a pre-natal diagnosis when it discloses a disabil-
ity constitutes a false choice because of the social and economic context
of the decision, as well as the medical milieu. Women with disabilities
reject a medical model of disability and tend to be sceptical of medicine
and science because of the role these have played in their own lives. For
these reasons the disability community rejects reproductive technology
at this time because it is likely to further disadvantage people with
disabilities.3 The community also rejects a medicalized discourse as
inappropriate to explain the issues surrounding reproductive technology.
Women who claim a reproductive disability also use language of
"choice", but conclude that restrictions on reproductive technology are
restrictions on their reproductive choice and autonomy. Reproductive
technology, especially in vitro fertilization (IVF), represents an apparent
solution to a particular woman's disadvantage. In arguing for access to
technology, women who claim a reproductive disability have adopted the
group-oriented disability discourse to gain access to resources for indi-
viduals. The focus is on the difficulties of an individual who has "chosen"
to become pregnant, who has been unsuccessful and is aware that the new
technology will allow her new ways of pursuing her choice. Medicalization
2. Certainly not all persons not able to bear their own genetic child would describe themselves
as reproductively disabled. Christine Overall in Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist
Analysis, (Winchester: Allen and Unwin Inc., 1987) has used the term "involuntarily childless"
to describe women who wish to bear or adopt children but are unable to do so because of
biological or social reasons. I do not mean to focus on infertility in this paper. The broad sketch
of reproductive disability is included to provide a contrast with women with disabilities and to
demonstrate the power of disability rights language.
3. See Canadian Disability Rights Council, FinalRecommendations to the Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies, July 5, 1992, (prepared by Sandra Goundry), for an
argument by disability activists to reject new reproductive technology. In this paper, I am
indebted to the work of Sandy Goundry, Shelagh Day, Gwen Brodsky and Maria Barile who
articulated the position of the Canadian Disability Rights Council (CDRC) and the Disabled
Women's Network (DAWN) for presentation to the Royal Commission on Reproductive
Technology.
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of the discourse is helpful in making this argument because of a charac-
terization of infertility as a treatable medical issue and the value we place
on universal health care.
I am conscious of the dangers of imposing these categories on women.4
Women with disabilities are not a homogeneous group and suggesting
that there is one life script or shared view on matters is misleading.
Because of the host of other differences in the lives of disabled women,
no single voice can properly speak for what would be a stereotype of a
disabled woman's experience. There is a similar vast array of differences
among women who describe themselves as reproductively disabled. I use
the distinction only to explore the sites of the life cycle where the social
nexus of gender and disability is most apparent.
In this paper, I first describe the problems in defining disability.
Secondly, I sketch some broad differences between women with other
disabilities and those who claim a reproductive disability. Thirdly, I
outline features of the reproductive technology debate that underlie these
positions. These features include appropriation of disability rights dis-
course by some women who claim a reproductive disability, the interpre-
tation of "choice", and the medicalization of the debate. Finally, I
distinguish how women with disabilities and women who claim a
reproductive disability use rights discourse through a differential empha-
sis on equality rights and rights to autonomy.
I. What Is Disability?
What is a proper definition of disability? Just what we are referring to, or
whom, is not clear. My main objective here is to outline why this question
matters. This section provides a framework for what women with
disabilities mean by "disability", suggesting why women who are invol-
untarily childless would embrace the term "disabled".
Many writers adopt some version of the World Health Organization's
distinctions among the terms "impairment", "disability" and "handicap".
4. Feminist theory has relatively recently begun to grapple with the "difference question", the
acknowledgement that feminist theory must account for differences among women along such
dimensions as race, class, sexual orientation and disability. See for example, Elizabeth
Speliman, "Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion" in Feminist Thought, (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1980):
Most philosophical accounts of 'man's nature' are not about women at all. But neither
are most feminist accounts of 'woman's nature' or 'woman's experiences' about all
women. There are startling parallels between what feminists find disappointing and
insulting in Western philosophical thought and what many women have found troubling
in much of Western feminism. (p.6)
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"Impairment" is defined as a deviation in physical or mental structure or
process; "disability" is a loss of function; "handicap" is a social phenom-
enon determined by the socio-cultural factors which surround and inter-
pret a condition.5 According to that taxonomy, impairment, (founded in
anatomical or physiological alteration) may or may not be correlated with
disability (a variation in ability to perform certain tasks) which may or
may not result in handicap.6 There are at least two problems with these
semantics. First, the categories are probably artificial and unhelpful
because they are interdependent and give no clues as to causality. Arising
out of a medical model, this view implies that impairment or disability
comes first and the condition is then processed through a social lens. But
disability may well be the result, rather than the source of a social
phenomenon. For example, an individual may be described and treated as
"mentally handicapped", not because of her abilities or her brain struc-
ture, but because of certain idiosyncracies. On account of the social power
of the label however, she may not perform certain tasks that she is able
to do, or may eventually lose the ability to perform the tasks. The second
problem with the concepts of "impairment" and "disability" is that they
appear to be neutral words because of their medico-technical associa-
tions. While this type of language appears to have no particular point of
view, medical terms are imbued with social judgments about what is
"healthy" or "pathological" and "normal" or "abnormal". This thinking
reflects an underlying value that favours abilities, but the social bias is
masked by categorization and language that purports to separate "objec-
tive" from "social" phenomena.
5. A similar formulation is found in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Disabled
Persons, passed in 1975 which defines a disabled person as:
Any person unable to ensure by himself or herself wholly or partly the necessities of a
normal individual and/or social life, as a result of a deficiency, either congenital or not,
in his or her physical or mental abilities.
6. Susan Wendell in "Feminist Theory of Disability" (Summer 1989), Hypatia, Vol.4, No.2,
criticizes the U.N. distinctions among the terms impairment, disability, and handicap, and
prefers simply to use the term "disability" to emphasize that disability is aphenomenon socially
constructed from biological reality. Wendell suggests that social oppression may be the only
thing that disabled people have in common. She suggests defining disability as a position from
which a disability politics might emerge rather than a set of attributes that are objectively
identifiable. (See footnote 5 of Wendell's article).
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The disability community rejects a medical model of disability and
instead, emphasizes social factors.7 Disability activists say that the
"normality-abnormality" continuum is not helpful in understanding
disability except to the extent that normality is understood as a social
interpretation. Disabled people often write about how painful it is to deal
with the responses of individuals to their disability and they say that these
reactions are often more difficult than the condition itself. Jenny Morris,
a woman with a disability, writes about ordinary reactions in ordinary
situations:
"Strangers in the street have a range of responses to us, from the 'How
marvellous you are!" through ignorance to the very obvious fear of the
alien nature of disability. Our common experience is that it is unlikely that
we can go out in public, to the shops, the theatres, the library, to pick our
children up from school etc. without encountering some reaction from a
total stranger. Libby says, "Some days I get really angry at the way people
stare at me in the street. I feel like saying 'I don't have three heads, do I?'
but most of the time I accept.it-after all I stare at disabled people myself.
I am nearly always self-conscious in public. I don'tlike being in situations
that attract too much attention. I hate it when mothers grab their toddlers
out of the way, saying 'Mind the lady, darling', even though I know they're
only trying to be considerate".'
Apart from the responses of individuals to disability, the ways in which
physical structures, cultural events, and services are organized reflects
what the disability rights movement refers to as an "ableist" bias, which
means that the specific needs for inclusive environments for people with
disabilities are not even considered. This systematic preference for
people who are considered to be able is reflected in the architecture,
cultural forms and service delivery of our society. For instance, going to
a restaurant that has a welcoming atmosphere to a person with a mobility
impairment does not mean a back door beside the garbage cans. It means
that the restaurant has a ground floor entrance or a ramp as the main
entrance, not as a second thought. Once inside the building, an accessible
bathroom means more than a bar beside the toilet. It means a very large
bathroom to allow a wheelchair to move around and a sink at an
7. Note for example an explicitly socio-political definition of physical disability which is
offered by the Union of Physically Impaired Against Society (UPIAS) that states:
Disability: the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social
organization which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments
and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities.
Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression.
8. Jenny Morris (ed.), Able Lives: Women's Experience of Paralysis (London: The Women's
Press, 1989), p.74.
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appropriate level, as well as an unencumbered route through the restau-
rant to the bathroom. At the tables, sugar and condiments are well within
reach from a sitting position. These details are often invisible to those who
are "able" and who have been socialized in a world oriented to the able.
Besides attention to structures and services in order to include people
with disabilities we need different social understanding of what depen-
dence and accommodation mean. In this vein, Morris describes the
particular way that our society views the dependence of people with
disabilities when they require certain services even though we all depend
on a host of services constantly in our daily lives:
For example, we all depend on water coming out of the tap when we turn
it on, while a disabled person such as Ann Mathison depends on someone
to help her get dressed in the morning. However, when non-disabled
people talk about water coming out of the tap, the issue is whether the water
company is reliable; when they talk about Anna being dependent on an
assistant, the issue for them is what they see as her helplessness created by
her physical limitations.
If water does not come out of the tap, the problem is identified as a failure
on the part of the water company. However, the nature of the problem when
Anna's assistant fails to help her get dressed when and how she wishes is
determined by the structure within which the service is provided. If Anna
pays her assistant and the assistant fails to do herjob properly, Anna may
sack her and get another (if she is both confident enough to do this and
certain that she can recruit another assistant.) If, however, Anna is in an
institution then she is unlikely to have the power to decide when and how
she gets dressed. Neither is she likely to have the power if the assistant is
provided by her local authority and is answerable to a Home Care
Organization rather than Anna herself. When Anna does not have control
over the provision of her personal care, the problem is considered to be her
own dependence and her demands which do not fit in with the service
provided.9
As a concept, disability is a social category mainly organized by those
with power, although people also control it by self-identifying as dis-
abled. Its construction is founded in part on our society's view of what are
9. Jenny Morris, PrideAgainst Prejudice: TransformingAttitudes to Disability (London: The
Women's Press, 1991), pp 137-38.
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the important "differences" between people.10 A formulation where
everyone is identified in abinary way as either "disabled" or notpromotes
a view of persons with disabilities as uniform, but the term "disability"
is not universally accepted by those with physical or mental impairments.
Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch ask:
Why should a limb-deficient girl, a teenager with mental retardation, or a
blind girl have anything in common with each other, or with a woman with
breast cancer or another woman who is recovering from a stroke? What
they share is similar treatment by sexist and disability-phobic society. That
is what makes it likely that they will be thrown together in school, in the
unemployment line, in segregated recreation programs, in rehabilitation
centres, and in legislation."
As the disability rights movement has asserted itself as a political force,
the specific language considered to be appropriate and respectful in
identifying specific disabilities has undergone many changes. As they
felt more empowered, disabled people have begun to name themselves
rather than have others label them, pointing out distinctions where they
think these are important.'2
While I attempt here to report examples of how women with disabili-
ties describe or define disability, very few of these voices have actually
been heard. I suggest thatthere are two reasons for this lack of voice: first,
the limited opportunities for disabled people to be heard, and second, the
purpose for which disability is usually defined. Disabled people have had
10. Martha Minow in Making All the Difference: Inclusion and Exclusion in American Law
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1990) has described the emphasis on "difference" in
disability as characteristic of legal thinking based on an abnormal/normal persons approach.
This dichotomous thinkingis carried overin a rights approach to disability. Her analysispoints
to the limitless actual differences that exist between people but where the significant social and
legal "differences" are defined by those in power. The central tension in the rights approach
is between affirmative action or special entitlements to right historical wrongs for oppressed
people alongside the similar treatment for all perspective. Minow's approach to difference as
an aspect of relationships emphasizes connectedness between persons rather than divisions.
11. Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch (eds), Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology,
Culture and Politics, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), at p. 6.
12. With thanks to Lynn Smith for pointing out the similarities between this development in
the disability rights movement and a similar moment in the development of feminism at which
time feminists began advocating strongly for changes in language toward gender-neutral and
inclusive forms. In a similar fashion other oppressed groups have struggled with referents to
themselves. For example, First Nations people have been referred to as "Indian," "aboriginal"
and "First Nations". Disabled people alter language as part of the process of social transforma-
tion. Distinctions between "hard of hearing" and "deaf' reflect important political concerns to
that sector of the disabled community. Recently the term "mentally retarded" has been replaced
by "mentally handicapped", "intellectually handicapped" "intellectually challenged" and
"developmentally disabled". These seemingly fine distinctions underscore different aspects of
a person's situation, including the permanence of the condition and its context.
Reproductive Technology and Disability
little opportunity to portray their own experiences within the general
culture or within radical social movements for reasons that are in part,
quite concrete. Often these limitations amount to issues of access to the
arenas of communication. Stairs present powerful barriers for people
with mobility impairments to speak at public meetings and the print
medium poses similar obstacles to people with visual impairments.
Whatever descriptions we have of disability in art, culture, and politics
have come largely from the viewpoint of the non-disabled. 13
Second, the most common reason motivating a definition for disability
is to adjudicate entitlements to benefits. These include entitlements under
insurance plans, both state-organized such as workers compensation or
disability welfare benefits, and disability benefits under private insurance
plans. The resulting definitions are organized and shaped by strong
economic incentives to keep costs down. Although the elements neces-
sary to establish disability are far from standardized, a common feature
of this disability labelling is that professionals, almost always doctors and
almost always non-disabled, determine whether a person has a disability
and its extent. Doctors, physiotherapists, and psychologists determine
disability through laboratory procedures, psychological tests and other
methods of assessment.
There is one important caveat to this political position of disability as
a social construction legitimated by a medical model as it is expressed by
activists. Understanding disability solely as discrimination, or as an
objectification of the other, names important processes that should and
can be ameliorated by true social commitment. However, this an incom-
plete statement. What is missing here is the subjective experience of
being disabled, and the extent to which social change can alter it. Jenny
Morris reminds us that:
A feminist perspective on disability must focus, not just on the socio-
economic and ideological dimensions of our oppression, but also on what
it feels like to be unable to walk, to be in pain, to be incontinent, to have
fits, to be unable to converse, to be blind or deaf, to have an intellectual
ability which is much below the average...
While the negative parts to the experience of being Black or gay in a white,
heterosexist society can be identified as wholly socially created, there are
13. See Deborah Kent, "In Search of a Heroine: Images of Women with Disabilities in Fiction
and Drama", in Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture and Politics, supra,
note 11. For a work that relies on the voices of people with disabilities, see Jenny Morris, supra,
note 8, who draws on the work of disabled writers, filmmakers, playwrights, poets and others
to convey the subjective reality of disability, an experience that is little represented in the
dominant culture.
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negative aspects of being disabled which would persist regardless of the
kind of society in which we live. 4
With an emphasis on 'objective' measurement and professional interpre-
tation, neither the subjective nor the social reality of disability are given
much weight. 5
I will use the term "disability" to reflect the three alternatives con-
tained in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: having a major
functional restriction as a result of a physical or mental impairment, or
having a history as such, or being perceived to have such a condition. 16
This legislation acknowledges that disability may have a medical basis,
that having had a disabling condition in the past may create the same
barriers as a current condition, and that the social and political context of
any condition is critical. But I have also incorporated the subjective
reality of disability as spoken by women with disabilities. I will argue
subsequently that those women who claim a "reproductive disability"
attempt to place themselves in this framework so that a properly founded
14. Morris, supra, note 8, pp. 70-71.
15. For a clear example ofhow medical approval is needed to define disability, and its specific
link to restricting entitlements to state benefits, see the definition of "handicapped" in s. 2 of
the Regulations pursuant to the Guaranteed Annual Income for Need Act, R.S.B.C. 1979,
c.158:
'Handicapped person' means an individual 18 years or older who, at the discretion of
the Director, has been designated as handicapped due to the individuals being mentally
ill or mentally retarded as defined in Section of the Provincial Mental Health Act, or due
to the individual, having a physical injury, amputation, or physical malfunction of the
body. Such designation shall be made only after a qualified medical practitioner has
confirmed that the disability is permanent and there is no remedial therapy available for
the individual to significantly lessen the disability, and provided the disability is
sufficiently severe that:
- the individual requires extensive assistance or supervision to manage normal
daily functioning, or
- as a direct result of the disability the individual requires unusual and continu-
ous monthly expenditures for transportation or for special diets or other
unusual but essential and continuous needs.
For purposes of these regulations, the foregoing definition excludes an individual who,
regardless of any physical or mental disability, has not tried nor completed all possible
medical treatment to overcome the disability. The definition also excludes an individual
whose reason for being unemployable is due primarily to causes other than those stated
in the first paragraph of this definition.
16. Americans withDisabilitiesActof 1990PubLNo 101-336,3(2), 104Stat327,330(1990)
A person with a disability
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits the person in
one or more major life activities; or
(2) has a record of such physical or mental impairment; or
(3) is regarded as having such a physical or mental impairment.
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claim of disability leads to an entitlement. If infertility is found to be a
disability it may follow that there is an entitlement to the benefit of
reproductive technology, most commonly IVF.
II. Women With Disabilities v. Women Who Claim a Reproductive
Disability: Points of Nexus of Gender and Disability in the Life
Cycle
Despite their shared use of the term "disability", the life experience of
women with disabilities is predictably different from women who claim
a reproductive disability. Such factors as the history of institutionaliza-
tion of disabled people, together with segregated education and job
markets, nearly ensures that women with disabilities experience the
world in a fundamentally different fashion than women with fertility
problems. Because of the different ways gender identity develops,
likelihood of membership in an alternate family or living arrangement,
relative income or employment levels and degree of confidence in
medical or technological solutions, these women are likely to express
different attitudes about reproductive technology.
First, in all likelihood, women with disabilities acquire the 'disability'
label earlier in life than women who claim a reproductive disability, so the
social construction of disability is more likely to shape the individual's
self-concept.1 7 As young girls and adolescents struggling with their
identities as women, including the accompanying questions of sexuality
and reproductive capacity, women with disabilities report that they have
grown up outside the particular experiences that typically characterize
heterosexual gender identification.18 Martha Saxton, a woman with spina
17. Major exceptions to this projection of life-cycle differences are cases where women
develop disabling conditions as a result of an accident or through the onset of a progressive
degenerative disease, such as multiple sclerosis. Socialization at puberty in these cases would
not differ in any systematic way because of disability. See for example Jenny Morris, supra,
note 8 which reports the results of a questionnaire study of such matters as sexuality and
intimate relationships, and motherhood, as the subjective experience of women with spinal
cord injuries acquired at different stages of life. Foran interesting account of the ways in which
gender affects strategies for coping with multiple sclerosis as an example of an adult-onset
condition, including issues such as marriage and continuity of employment, see Susan Russell,
"From Disability to Handicap: an Inevitable Response to Social Constraints?" (1989), 26 Can.
Rev. of Soc. and Anthrop. See also Bonnie Klein "'We Are Who You Are': Feminism and
Disability", Ms (November-December 1992), Volume III, No. 3 for an account of her onset of
disability in her mid-forties because of a stroke and her difficulties in identifying with other
women with disabilities.
18. See Adrienne Harris and Dana Wideman "The Construction of Disability and Early
Attachment" in Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch (eds), supra, note 11 for a critique of the use
of psychology, particularly psychoanalytic theory, to explain gender identification generally
and in particular, gender identification for girls with disabilities.
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bifida, discusses her special confusion about sexuality and gender during
adolescence. Although her family raised her to think of herself as
'normal' she says:
I wasn't sure if the teenage magazines, the scenes at the movies, the
clandestine discussions with other girls really applied to me.19
Rather than being relieved at missing these often turbulent and unpleasant
times, women with disabilities report that their gender, sexuality, and
capacity to be mothers 0 were simply ignored.21 In contrast, those women
who describe themselves as reproductively disabled can only encounter
this after the condition is discovered, usually well into adulthood. By this
time the struggles with puberty and adolescence and initial sexuality have
19. Martha Saxton, "Born and Unborn: the Implications of Reproductive Technologies for
People with Disabilities", in Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein and Shelley Minden (eds), Test-
Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood, (London: Pandora Press, 1984) p. 305. For a
review of several empirical studies of disability and the development of heterosexual
behaviour around adolescence, see Harilyn Rousso, "Daughters with Disabilities: Defective
Women or Minority Women?" in "The Construction of Disability and Early Attachment" in
Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch (eds), supra, note 11 where the authors study heterosexual
behaviour of women disabled before adolescence and after adolescence, and found later
development for those with pre-adolescent disabilities. Parental expectations were seen as
critically important by the women.
20. For other personal accounts of the development of the disabled woman's view of herself
as a potential mother or as a sexual being, see, for example, Maria Barile, a woman with a
disability who says in "New Reproductive Technologies: Socio-Economics versus The Rights
of Women with Disabilities" in Four Discussion Papers on New Reproductive Technologies.
Prepared by CRDC and DAWN (1990), supra, note 3:
Many women with disabilities are socialized to believe that they are unfit to be good
mothers, especially with regard to the child-bearing process. Some of us are wrongfully
led to believe that spasticity during delivery, for instance, could kill the baby or that a
pregnancy could not be carried to term. These myths have been and continue to be
embeddedin the minds of young girls with disabilities and appearto be very real to many
of them. (p.24)
See also Mary Jane Owen, "A Romp Through Metaphor Land", Disability Rag, January/
February 1987, p. 11 in which college students were asked to free associate about the term
'disabled woman'. While words signifying dependency were frequent responses (eg. 'sorry',
'almost lifeless', 'grey'), words associated with sexuality and motherhood were almost entirely
absent.
21. NasaBegum in "Disabled Women and theFeminist Agenda" (1992), 40 Feminist Review
70 describes how certain areas of feminist concern impact differently on disabled women.
These include gender roles, body image, and sexuality. With respect to gender roles she argues
that the attainment of traditional gender roles for disabled women may be seen as a real sense
of achievement. Quoting from Rousso, supra, note 19 at p. 159:
Ipushed myselfto the very things thatmyparents saidlcould nothave. I was determined
to prove that I was a 'normal' woman. I deliberately sought the most handsome man to
parade me around. And although I did not consciously intend to do it, I became pregnant
out of wedlock at 17, which was extremely affirming for me. One of my proud moments
was parading around the supermarket with my belly sticking out for all to see that I was
indeed a woman, and that my body worked like a normal woman's body. (at p. 74)
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concluded with the accompanying consequences for gender identity.
Disability has not been relevant in a developmental way to the sexual,
female or reproductive self.22
Women who have been disabled for much of their lives are more likely
to be living in an arrangement that is an alternative to the traditional
nuclear family.? Although many feminists conclude that the traditional
nuclear family is an oppressive institution, "the struggle against the
family may be different for those who are excluded from the outset".24 A
larger proportion of adult women with disabilities are single rather than
married or in a couple relationship. Adult women with disabilities live
more often with their parents, and describe their feelings of being
restricted and over-protected? For many women with disabilities, an
alternate living arrangement in adulthood is a variation or extension of an
institutional environment that continues from childhood,26 and arrange-
ments where unrelated adults live together in a group home are more
common within the disability community than elsewhere in our society.
As well, the special relationships that develop between people with
disabilities and their attendants are somewhat unique. In contrast, women
who describe themselves as reproductively disabled are more likely than
disabled women to be married, in heterosexual relationships, and living
in a traditional family both as child and as adult.
Second, women with disabilities are overwhelmingly poor and under-
employed. The combination of segregated education and systemic dis-
crimination in employment has a devastating effect on the income and
employment prospects of women with disabilities. Often education has
22. I do not mean to imply that reproductive disability does not create pain, or feelings of
failure to the individual. Indeed, women with fertility problems describe processes similar to
a grieving reaction for their situation. My point is simply that the differences in the acquisition
of disability in the life-cycle of women will have different consequences.
23. On appeal to the Supreme CourtofCanada in Canada (A-G) v. Mossop (1990),71 D.L.R.
(4th) 662 the Canadian Disability Rights Council successfully argued to be an intervenor, in
part on the basis that disabled people had an interest in a case about the definition of "family"
and same-sex benefits because people with disabilities so often live in unusual groupings of
individuals.
24. Begum, supra, note 21, p. 75.
25. See for example, J. Campling, Images ofOurselves, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1981), p. 17.
26. While a full discussion of the effects of institutionalization is much beyond the scope of
this paper, it is useful to bear in mind a finding that there are five common descriptions of
institutional life approached in diverse ways. These are: loss of liberty, social stigma, loss of
autonomy, depersonalization, and low material standards. (See K. Jones and A.J. Fowles,Ideas
on Institutions-Analyzing the Literature of Long-term Care and Custody, (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1984). The relatively recent movement toward de-institutionalization of
children and adults with disabilities should have a significant effect on living arrangements for
people with disabilities.
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been interrupted when required resources were no longer available. In
contrast, there is no reason why the education attained by women who
claim reproductive disabilities should correspond to that of the general
population.
Third, women with disabilities and those who claim a reproductive
disability have different orientations to medicine and technology. Infer-
tility was conceptualized as a disability in the same era as the develop-
ment of certain of the new reproductive technologies and the whole
purpose of in vitro fertilization is to treat infertility. Therefore a woman
who claims to be reproductively disabled is likely to actively seek out
medical solutions to her problems and has adopted a disability label, in
part to ensure access to medical technology. 7 By comparison, many
women with other disabilities have likely developed a well-founded
distrust of medicine and science. A negative body image by disabled
women may be derived from, or at least reinforced by doctors' treatment,
perhaps most critically during adolescence, 28 and women with disabili-
ties may well conclude that:
Our bodies have been the targets of medical abuse. We have been
hospitalized and have spent years in doctors' offices and still our bodies
have not cooperated. Some ofus livein chronicpain and some with chronic
unpredictability and others with chronic stares. We have felt the personal
invasion of surgeries and endless diagnostic procedures.29
27. SeeD. Wells, "Ectogenesis, Justice and Utility: a Reply to James", (1987), Bioethics 1(4)
who argues that the inability to produce one's own genetic children is primafacie a disability
in the same way as near-sightedness, and that failing to treat infertility would be as foolish as
failing to treat nearsightedness. The analogy is faulty because improving vision is perceived
to be a desirable objective in a more universal sense than the ability to reproduce one's own
genetic offspring.
28. See, for example, this description by J. Campling supra, note 25, about the effect of
medical treatment on body image:
Having a disability made me very aware at an early age of the messages I was receiving
from the larger society about how I was supposed to look and how you're supposed to
be. Also, as the doctors poked and studied me endlessly, Ileamt more quickly than some
non-disabled that I am seen as an object ... I was made to walk naked ... and then lie
on a mat while in turn they (5 male students) examined my body, opening and closing
my legs, poking and prodding here and there and making comments. I was at the age
when I was developing from a child into a woman ... I started to lose my self respect.
(p.10)
29. "This body I love-finding ourselves" in Susan Browne etal. (eds.), With the PowerofEach
Breath: A Disabled Women'sAnthology, (Pittsburgh: Cleis Press, 1985), p. 246. For a general
discussion of the way that the medicalization of disability has affected women with disabilities
see Nancy Hansen in "Surmounting Perfect Body Syndrome: Women with Disabilities and the
Medical Profession," in Houston Stewart, Beth Percival, Elizabeth Epperly (eds.), The More
We Get Together, Canadian Research Instituteforthe Advancement of Women (Charlottetown:
Gynergy, 1992).
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All too often, the "magical cure" solution that medicine or science offered
failed miserably and women with disabilities may well view medicine as
a series of false promises. Lesley Hall writes:
When I was sixteen I paid my last visit to an orthopaedic surgeon. He
wanted to carve me up, perform a miracle on me and transform me into a
normal person. But this time, I intended to say no. I thought of how I should
tell him this. After six years, I was tired of the miracle cures that never
worked...
I went into the doctor's office hoping that I would have the guts to reject
this operation. It was a carrot that the medical profession kept dangling
before my eyes.30
In short, women with disabilities often find that they engage with a world
where the particular combination of gender and disability results in
consequences that are different than they would be for non-disabled
women or men. The result of the gender-disability nexus is crystallized
in matters of sexuality, reproduction and motherhood. In the following
section, I argue that the life experiences of women with disabilities
informs not only their conclusiois about reproductive technology, but
also results in their rejecting a liberal and medicalized framework for
discussing the issues, while women with claims of reproductive disabili-
ties argue their case within the medical discourse.
Ill. The Discourse
1) Appropriation
Long before the technological advances that led to the development of
new reproductive technologies and the accompanying socio-political
questions, people with disabilities lobbied for a more inclusive society.
Their arguments, expressed recently in rights language, included such
principles as accessibility, reasonable accommodation, dignity, respect,
and full participation in social life for people with disabilities. While
these principles have not yet achieved the universal realization hoped for,
30. Lesley Hall, "Beauty Quests-A Double Disservice, Beguiled, Beseeched and Born-
barded-Challenging the Concept of Beauty" in Diane Driediger and Susan Gray (eds.),
Imprinting Ourlmage:An InternationalAnthology by Women with Disabilities, (Charlottetown:
Gynergy, 1992), p.135.
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the concepts have been noted and accepted by some courts." To some
extent, then, the courts have used human rights legislation and Charter
provisions to echo in law the desirability of a society in which all persons
participate in social life regardless of ability. Increased costs to govern-
ments or private parties should not easily defeat the right of people with
disabilities to be included.12 More importantly for the purpose of this
paper, the ideas of disability rights have trickled into popular conscious-
ness. Although their absence is still much more evident than their
presence, disabled people are more visible in society now than in the past,
as are the specific entitlements that have followed rights arguments.
Wheelchair ramps, close-captioning on television, elevator buttons with
Braille numbers are necessary entitlements in an inclusive society.
Children with disabilities are beginning to attend regular classrooms at
age appropriate levels.
In this context of growing social awareness and developing jurispru-
dence on disability rights, individuals with fertility problems have
appropriated a disability rights discourse to gain access to resources and
services forged by earlier efforts at advocating very different disability
issues. While Ipropose here that the term "reproductive disability" builds
on the efforts of the disability movement, I am neither suggesting that
there has been a planned and conscious takeover of a discourse, nor that
any appropriation is morally reprehensible, but rather that there has been
31. Few discrimination cases based specifically on disability issues have reached appellate
courts in Canada, although several important decisions by courts and human rights tribunals
extend to disability issues. For example, in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v
Canadian Odeon TheatresLtd. (1981), 122D.L.R. (3d) 381, the court decided thatpersons who
use wheelchairs must be given an appropriate seat in a movie theatre, not necessarily the same
seat thatis offered to any other able-bodied patron. The notion of formal equality was rejected.
In CDRC etc. statutory disqualification from voting on the basis of incapacity to control
finances constituted discrimination because it was not an appropriate test of capacity for the
specific situation. See also Woolverton et al. v. B.C. Transit operating "HandyDART",
Decision of the B.C. Human Rights Council (unreported), August 13, 1992 in which scooter
users alleged discrimination because they were required to transfer from their scooters to seats
when using HandyDART, a parallel transit service for persons with mobility restrictions.
Despite expert evidence about safety concerns and an argument that this risk presented an
"undue hardship" to B.C. Transit, the party providing the service, the respondent was found in
violation of the Human Rights Act.
32. Although the issue of costs to governments on disability related issues has not yet been
litigated, increased cost has not generally been found to justify violations of rights. See Re:
Singh and the Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 117 where the court
found that increased cost to government did not save the government's failure to grant an
appropriate oral hearing to refugee claimants. In J.C. v Forensic Psychiatric Services
Commisssion et al., (February 28, 1991), S.C.B.C., No. A873287, the court found that the
expense involved in providing equal housing for men and women patients did not constitute
a defence to discriminatory treatment by gender.
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a sense of identification with a particular social category that has attracted
entitlements by the use of rights discourse. In pursuing their project,
women who claim areproductive disability draw on both the symbols and
actual victories of a different political movement. As a result of their
differences in life stories and in social location from women with
disabilities, women who claim a reproductive disability transform sub-
stantially the discourse they borrow, especially on the questions of
"choice" and the role of medical debate.
2) "Choice"
References to autonomy and "choice" are pervasive in discussions of
sexual and reproductive matters.33 Rape and forced sterilization are some
explicit examples where choice is absent for women and a pro-choice
position on abortion or the availability of a midwife rather than a doctor
to attend during pregnancy are rallying points for advocating the right to
choose for individual women. "Choice", however, occupies a very
different niche in the argument on reproductive technology by women
with disabilities and those who claim a reproductive disability. Women
with fertility problems address what they perceive as an absence of choice
when they lament the difficulties in access to IVF. By way of contrast,
women with disabilities bring a more critical perspective to what"choice"
means to them within the context of reproduction and disability.
Reproductive choice for women with disabilities has a very particular
meaning derived from an historical context that includes lack of informa-
tion about birth control, forced sterilization and prescriptions of unsafe
contraceptives. Because women with disabilities have experienced dis-
advantage in arange of contexts, they are likely to have a somewhatjaded
view of the meaningfulness of individual choices in the abstract. In all
probability, choices have already been more restricted in their own lives.
Barriers to physical facilities, education, employment, information, and
33. In a talk at Queens University in 1992, Diana Majury has described the pul of the concept
of "choice" and the negative reactions to restrictions on choice in various feminist discussions,
including reproductive technology. The effect of restrictions on access to abortion are far more
serious than the effect of restricting choice regarding access to IVF. Restrictions on abortion
result in defined negative outcomes both for society and for the individual such as higher
teenage births, and physical and psychological damage to women. Any risk associated with
abortion is relatively low except when the abortion is coerced. In contrast, limiting "choice"
by restricting reproductive technology (referring here mainly to IVF) has virtually no negative
impact at the societal level. At the individual level the restriction on choice means that some
women may not be able to bear their own child, and given the scarcity of white, able-bodied
newborns, may not be able to adopt a baby.
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social relationships are some of the particular areas of the experience of
discrimination where the notion of individual choice has fallen away.
Urging extreme caution in the use of pre-natal diagnosis, disability
rights activists worry that the existence, availability, or use of pre-natal
testing limits, rather than enhances, true reproductive choice because of
social attitudes toward disability?4 While these tests purport only to
provide additional information to the woman about her pregnancy,
certain diagnoses lead almost inevitably to the termination of the preg-
nancy and disabled people say this reflects a value judgement on their
own lives as "not worth living", thereby exacerbating the existing
discrimination against disabled people." The disability community ar-
gues strenuously that the enormous fearof disability,3 6 the incorrect belief
that most disability arises from inherited conditions 37 and the reliance on
medical information to understand disability all support the moral right-
ness that a pre-natal test revealing disability should lead to an abortionY.3
The disability rights community says that any "choice" about a specific
pregnancy is more apparent than real in these circumstances but the
appearance of "choice" is consistent with "ableist biases" and a dominant
ideology that values autonomy and individualism.
34. Janice Tait, "Reproductive Technology and the Rights of Disabled Persons", (1986), 1
Canadian Journal Of Women and the Law, describes the discomfort with "choice" as a slogan
taking on new meaning in reproductive technology:
The choice is often represented as that between having a "healthy baby" or a "defective
child" by physicians who pioneered the "improvements". And what shall be termed a
"defect?" Downs Syndrome? Spina bifida? Wrong sex? What about cleft palate and
hare lip? If the technology fails to detect the "defect" what status will the newborn have
if she comes into the world disabled?
35. Statistics indicate that 90% of pregnancies are terminated after amniocentesis reveals a
disability. See M. deWachter, "Prenatal Diagnosis", in D.J. Roy (ed.) Life Technologies and
Public Policy, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986).
36. Fear of disability is tenacious in our society. For a gripping account of the anxiety
associated with having a disabled child by a disability activist herself, see Anne Finger, Past
Due: A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and Birth, (Seattle, Washington: Seal Press, 1990). See
also Rayna Rapp, "XYLO: A True Story", in Arditti et aL (eds.), supra, note 19, pp.3 13-327 .
37. The incorrect assumption that there is a higher probability of disability with a mother with
a disability is true for only a limited number of conditions. The hereditary nature of certain
disabilities is, however, a widely held notion. In 1927, Justice Oliver Wendell Homes Jr. wrote
for the U.S. Supreme Court approving compulsory sterilization for mentally handicapped
persons against their will because "three generations of imbeciles is enough," in Buck v. Bell,
(1927), 274 U.S. 200.
38. See Ruth Hubbard, The Politics of Women's Biology, (New Brunswick; London: Rutgers
University Press, 1990):
Women are expected to implement the society's eugenic prejudices by 'choosing' to
have the appropriate tests and 'electing' not to initiate or to terminate pregnancies if it
looks like the outcome will offend. (p.19 7)
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A woman who claims a reproductive disability will be more inclined
to assume, in a liberal sense, that she has the right to make individual
choices in life. It follows that the injustice she perceives in her situation
arises from the discovery that the choice of biological motherhood seems
unavailable to her. The frustration and sense of injustice is increased by
any impediments (such as cost or limited resources) to the choice to avail
herself of assistive technology.
3) Medicine
Although the disability rights community along with the feminist com-
munities have called for a moratorium on in vitro fertilization, and
women who claim reproductive disabilities want a right of access to that
technology, all understand any version of reproductive "choice" to be
limited by the role of medicine and the state in reproductive technology.39
Despite their general agreement that medicine controls or limits women's
reproductive decisions, women with disabilities go farther in their cri-
tique of the medical model and its relationship to power, by rejecting
medical discourse as inappropriate to frame their arguments about
reproductive technology. Ironically, women with reproductive disability
claims advance their position more effectively by using medical dis-
course. Women with disabilities refuse to accept the parameters of a
medical debate mainly because of the perceived connection between
eugenics and medicine. As well, they see an incompatibility between
reproductive issues as defined by women and the objectives of medical
scientists in pursuing reproductive questions.
From their particular concern about pre-natal diagnosis, disability
rights activists liken the effects of reproductive technology to the most
horrific modem program of eugenics, the Nazi program of racial hygiene.
While it is true that the decision as to who should live and who should die
39. Some of the feminist critique of the increasingly intrusive role of medicine, law and the
state in women's reproduction are reflected in: Sheilah Martin, "The Control of Women
through Gender-Biased Laws on Human Reproduction" in Richard F. Devlin (ed.), Canadian
Perpectives on Legal Theory, (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991). For
a Charter analysis of forced Caesarian sections, see Isabel Grant "Forced Obstetrical Interven-
tion: A Charter Analysis" (1989), 39 U.of Toronto L.J. An amusing but telling anecdote is
related in Gena Corea, The Hidden Malpractice: How American Medicine Treats Women as
Patients and Professionals, (New York: Morrow, 1977) which describes a 1972 raid of the
Feminist Women's Health Centre in Los Angeles that was conducted by 10 police officers and
a detective. Carol Downer, the originator of the self-help concept, pleaded guilty to fitting a
diaphragm, for which she was fined $200 and put on probation for two years. During the raid,
the police tried to confiscate some yoghurt, known to be a gynaecological remedy, but they
released the substance whenone of the collective members informed them thatitwas her lunch.
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was made by the men of the state in Nazi Germany, the justification for
the decisions was given by doctors and scientists. In other words, the
particular form of the eugenics movement could not have been carried out
without a collaboration between the state and medicine/science. Accord-
ing to the disability rights perspective, reproductive technology provides
a new way to perpetuate programs of population purification. With the
expanded capabilities of amniocentesis and chorionic villi sampling n0
certain disabling conditions can be detected but not changed with the
tools of current medicine and technology.41 Disability activists say that
this technology allows for a particularly insidious version of eugenics
because it exists in an environment in which principles of equality of
opportunity are said to be important, where science and medicine are
assumed to be value-free and where the bias toward the ablest goes
largely unexamined. 42 Yet the search for perfect babies is what legiti-
mates vast amounts of medical research monies to expand the range of
pre-natal diagnosis, where the focus of research is usually removed from
40. Amniocentesis is a procedure that samples the amniotic fluid at approximately the
sixteenth week of pregnancy using a syringe applied externally to the abdomen. The results of
amniocentesis are not available until nearly the 20th week of pregnancy. Chorionic villi
sampling is a tissue sample taken from the 8th to 10th week of pregnancy by the insertion of
an instrument vaginally. Both techniques are performed in conjunction with ultra-sound to
locate the position of the fetus. Certain genetic conditions of the fetus such as Downs
Syndrome, may be diagnosed with these procedures. Each carries a certain risk of miscarriage.
41. Some of the pre-natal genetic diagnoses constitute disabling conditions from birth such as
spina bifida, while other diagnoses are genetic conditions that do not appear until middle age,
such as Huntington's disease. Unlike the corrective measures that result from an Rh disease
finding, there are no measures that can change the genetic endowment of the fetus to eliminate
Downs Syndrome or Huntington's disease. According to Yvonne Peters, in "New Reproduc-
tive Technologies: aThreat or aBenefit to Equality" in CRDC and DAWN Discussion Papers,
supra, note 20:
This broad scope of prenatal testing not only encourages a form of eugenics but also
promises to control and manage disabilities from the womb to the grave. (p.17)
Pre-natal diagnosis may mean an increasing medical tracking or state-control throughout life
as techniques are developed to detect conditions that appear later in life.
42. In discussions preceding amendments to the Criminal Code about abortion in 1967,
representation by the Canadian Medical Association to a committee of the House of Commons
set out the grounds for a legal abortion and contained a provision permitting legal abortion if
the fetus was defective in some way. This position was taken before the use of amniocentesis
but it was the medical establishment's position that doctors could assess whether the fetus was
defective by clinical experience. In the end, Parliament did not give such discretion to doctors
and this ground was dropped from the amendment. See Janine Brodie, Shelley Gavigan and
Jane Jenson, The Politics of Abortion, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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women's health is sues.43 In this context the information derived from pre-
natal diagnosis is presented as objective data from which a woman is
expected to exercise 'free choice' in deciding whether to continue a
pregnancy.
Although pre-natal testing is accompanied by genetic counselling to
assist women in making a decision about pregnancy, the counselling is
usually in a hospital and carried out by medical personnel. The disability
community says that appropriate "counselling" associated with pre-natal
diagnosis should not be limited to medical, rehabilitation or psychologi-
cal information but should include contact with people with the particular
diagnosis or with their parents in order to convey the experiential
component of disability which would speak not only to practical advice
but also to the joys and sadnesses of the experience. Medical facts are
simply insufficient upon which to understand or decide.'
Besides the eugenic component of prenatal diagnosis, the disability
community stresses that emphasis on medical detection techniques re-
orients the discussion of disability in a harmful way. Pre-natal testing
aims to eradicate disability in biological terms and thereby diverts public
attention away from the eradication of disability discrimination. Any
expectation that prenatal diagnosis techniques will effectively eliminate
disability distracts discussion and resources away from the many other
causes of disability and away from discrimination, social matters that
society can do something about.45
43. PatriciaSpallone, Beyond Conception: the New Politics ofReproduction, (Granby, Mass.:
Bergin and Garvey, 1989), describes the divergent interests between the scientists who develop
reproductive technology and women who will be affected by it. She argues that virtually any
basic research question can be conceptualized as leading to important answers about health
matters some time in thefuture and she explains that scientists do this in applications to granting
agencies all the time. However, the more important reason for research is: "No 'test-tube'
babies, no prize-winning research". (p. 107).
44. The way in which information is disseminated is important. For example, see Ann Finger:
"Claiming All of our Bodies, Reproductive Rights and Disability," in Browne, S. Connors, D.
Stern N. (eds), supra, note 29 for an insightful view of the way in which information is
disseminated when a disabling condition is found in the fetus. For example, a disabled woman
chose to have amniocentesis in order to determine whether the fetus had Downs syndrome or
spina bifida. The woman had no intention of aborting the fetus in those circumstances, but
wanted the information because of her own special needs. She was shocked by the assumption
at a group counselling session that anyone would abort such a fetus. Calling the clinic after the
session to voice her objections, she was informed that the clinic felt it should present as negative
a position as possible.
45. As well, an increased attention to genetic causes of disabilities de-emphasizes the wide
range of environmental contributors to disability such as traffic and work-place accidents. In
its final report to the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, supra, note 3,
the CDRC suggests that the major cause of infant disability is poverty-related-that is, poor
maternal nutrition (p. 5). See as well Anne Finger, "A Lot to Learn", March/April 1990 The
Disability Rag 28.
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On the other hand, women who claim a reproductive disability place
their arguments within a medical discourse in this debate. Accepting a
medical discourse here means three things: first, accepting a medical
model of disability; second, formulating the problem as an allocation of
medical resources; and thirdly, appealing to the social value of universal
health care. By placing their arguments on entitlement to IVF within a
medical framework, women who claim a reproductive disability accept
a medical definition of disability: impairment is viewed as "fixable" or at
least alleviated by medical intervention. This argument is premised on a
right to infertility treatment as a right to health care, an argument with a
special appeal in Canada because of this country's history and its pride in
universal health care.46 Questions about rights to treatment and moral
dilemmas about allocating medical resources are current and newswor-
thy topics for the discipline of bioethics.47 Medical ethicists, health care
economists, as well as writers in the popular media, are accustomed to
discussing such questions as the criteria for selecting transplant recipi-
ents, the appropriateness of"no rescusitation" orders, and other questions
about distributing medical resources. Access to reproductive technology
is a similar issue in this familiar category of questions.
To date, medical personnel have assumed control over decisions about
who gets access to the technology and how pre-natal diagnoses are
communicated to women48. Not surprisingly, there are indications that
the medical establishment has been widely accepted as the legitimate
authority to exercise power in this realm. For instance, in its report on
reproductive technology, the Warnock Commission recommends com-
pulsory counselling for anyone who wishes in vitro fertilization, and
46. Canada's commitment to universal health care is now echoed in the Canada Health Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-6.
Section 3 provides:
It is hereby declared that the primary objective in Canadian health care is to protect,
promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada and to
facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers.
47. Questions of "distributivejustice" in the sense of allocation and access to services attract
much more attention with respect to medical services than, for example, with respect to legal
services. See Paul R. Tremblay, "Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering and Street-Level
Bureaucracy" (1992), 43(4) Hastings Law Journal 960 who posits that health care is viewed
as more of a right than legal care and that cost is therefore a more pressing concern. Further,
medical care is more visibly controlled by government while legal care is more likely seen as
the responsibility of families. My point here is simply that the access questions of reproductive
technology fit into an existing and familiar debate within bioethics.
48. See Recommendations 10-12 in the CDRC's final recommendations to the Commisssion
on New Reproductive Technology, which speak to a formal Code of Ethics that has a
"disability-positive" underpinning for the professionals who are involved in reproductive
technology and the dissemination of information about pre-natal testing.
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genetic counselling is already a mandatory component of pre-natal
testing in Canada.
The argument that women now advance for access to IVF has some
similar features to the struggle for access to abortion in Canada. In the
1960's, access to abortion was broadened by amending legislation. While
the change obviously benefitted women because abortion was more
available, the motivation for increasing access came not to protect or
liberate women but to serve the interests of doctors.4 9 Doctors said that
they were performing abortions on a regular basis as medical care for
women and argued successfully that their professional medical treatment
be "de-criminalized". Ironically, as has been true on the issue of abortion,
the "medicalization" of reproductive technology may serve the interests
of women who claim a reproductive disability. But medicalization does
not serve women with disabilities well. In short, women with fertility
problems have adopted disability rights language to further their claims
to entitlements and have adopted medical discourse in argument despite
the fact that the disability rights movement has concluded that such a
discourse is inconsistent with its interests.
IV. Rights Arguments: Rights to Equality v. Autonomy
Women lobbying for access to IVF because of a claim of reproductive
disability argue access as a "right". Women with disabilities call for the
greatest care in reproductive technology, especially pre-natal diagnosis,
and argue in part that the "rights" of disabled people are threatened by
reproductive technology. How do rights arguments allow this variety of
conclusions? What predictions can we make about the "success" of
presenting such rights arguments?
In general, the disability community focuses on two different formu-
lations of rights: equality and autonomy. 50 Equality rights are conceived
as a group right, a collective right of a disadvantaged group. Remedies
such as employment equity programs, fully accessible public transit
49. See Brodie et aL, supra, note 42. The real purpose behind the provisions of the Criminal
Code was to protect doctors from criminal liability, rather than to reflect in law reproductive
rights for women. Similarly, in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, in which the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down the criminal sanction against abortion, four of the judgements
focus on procedural problems in availability of medically approved facilities for abortion,
rather than on any woman-centred critique of the legislation.
50. The distinction between rights to autonomy and rights to equality is somewhat misleading
because the concepts both arise from a base of individualism. Rights to autonomy are clearly
individualistic. Equality rights arebased on acomparison between individuals by both drawing
out similarities between individuals to form a category or group, and distinguishing members
of the category from members of other categories.
120 The Dalhousie Law Journal
systems and integrated education benefit the disadvantaged group as a
whole by altering the conditions that lead to systemic discrimination. The
right of autonomy means recognizing the differences that exist between
individuals and that an individual's life and decisions should be treated
with dignity and respect. An example of the right to autonomy would be
an acknowledgement, for example, that a person with a mental illness
should have the right to consent or to refuse a recommended medical
treatment. These different objectives are somewhat paradoxical because
they emphasize, differentially, the concerns of the individual and collec-
tive aspirations. Women with disabilities reject reproductive technology
insofar as it threatens group-based or equality concerns, mostly by the use
of prenatal diagnosis. As a result, the disability community generally
leaves for another day the autonomy concerns of the individual with a
disability who might benefit from reproductive technology because she
is having difficulty becoming pregnant.5
1
The value of pre-natal testing as an aid to reproductive choice is
especially problematic to women with disabilities but the significance of
pre-natal testing and the demand for perfect babies is not limited to the
interests of the disability community. Arguably the issues around pre-
natal testing affect all women because of the symbolic connection
between women and motherhoodin our culture 2 and the strong belief that
mothers are responsible for the way their children turn out.53 Declining
the test that would have disclosed a disability and subsequently giving
birth to a child with a disability, or giving birth to a child with a disability
after receiving information that the fetus had a disability, means that
51. This is a matter of emphasis, however. In the final CDRC Report to the Royal Commission
on Reproductive Technologies (supra, note 3), Recommendation 1(d) refers to the availability
of reproductive technology on an equal basis to anyone who wants it as a human rights
principle, and Recommendations 13 and 14 state more specifically that there be no disability-
related eligibility criteria for access to reproductive technologies. Restricted access to repro-
ductive technology for women with disabilities constitutes discrimination in two ways: by
restricting access to the technology on the faulty assumption that disability is most likely to be
genetically based, and secondly on the basis that women with disabilities will not be good
mothers.
52. Because of the tenacious connection between the vision of women and motherhood in our
society, the construction of motherhood becomes important to all women even if they have
decided not to have children. See, for example, Martha L. Fineman, "Images of Mothers in
Poverty Discourses" (1991), 2 Duke Law Journal 276.
53. The recent movement toward international adoptions reflects the demand for perfection.
The reason seems to be that the number of "perfect" and "pristine" local babies has diminished.
There are still babies locally who are described as disabled or older children who are available
for adoption. There seems to be more willingness to deal with the legal and bureaucratic
problems of international adoption and other issues attendant with adopting a child from a
different country than the willingness to accept a less than perfect child.
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mothers can be blamed for the ways that their children turn out at an
earlier point than ever before . 4
While the disability community has argued its issues in "rights"
language, asserting "rights" may not be useful to predict or to achieve
particular outcomes,55 whether the rights are based on individual con-
cerns such as autonomy or privacy or based in collective concerns such
as equality. A rights analysis almost always involves deciding between
competing rights56 or the state controls how resources are dispensed, or
54. Barbara Katz Rothman in Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a
Patriarchal Society (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989) argues that the ideology of
motherhood leads to a commodification of reproduction where the child becomes the product
of the reproductive process. The commodification leads to an evaluation of womanhood that
depends on an evaluation of motherhood. Presumably, the quality of the product (the child)
becomes an important component in evaluating the person as a mother and as a woman. Susan
Penfold and Gillian Walker, Women and the Psychiatric Paradox, (Montral: Eden Press,
1983), Chapter VI, suggest that the eugenic tendencies in the thinking of medicine in the early
20th century was followed by an undercurrent of motherblaming for a host of economic,
political and social problems around World War 1. The authors do not draw any causal links
between eugenics and motherblaming but that question remains open. There are few tools in
any situation that can predict what our children will be like when they grow up. Ruth Hubbard
reminds us, supra, note 38:
With all the prenatal tests in the world, we cannot know what our children will be like,
whether they will be healthy and able-bodied and remain so, and what sorts of people
they will be when they grow up. We have the best chance of successful parenthood if
we are prepared to accept our children, whoever they are, and do the best we can to help
them accept themselves and, hopefully, us too ... Sparing no expense to develop
techniques for diagnosing disabilities prenatally, so as to prevent the birth of children
who have them, accentuates the stigma to which people with disabilities, as well as their
families, are exposed. (p.169)
55. See for example, Joel Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't
Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)", in Devlin, supra, note 39.
56. The competing rights of fathers and fetuses in the field of reproduction have been widely
discussed. These are especially problematic when the state intervenes, especially on behalf of
the fetus in issues of abortion, forced Caesarian sections, or legislation to control the lives of
women during pregnancy. See, for example Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Services
Trustees, [1979] Q.B. 276, aff'd at [1987] 1 All E.R. 1230 (sub. nom C. v. S.) and Paton v.
United Kingdom (1980), 3 E.H.R.R. 408; Re: BabyR (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 225 (B.C.S.C.).
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other factors are at play, 7 so that regardless of the strength of a rights
argument any prediction about outcome must be guarded. Still, rights
cannot be forgotten because of their pervasiveness in the ideological and
symbolic realm. Rights are popular and bring a claim into "a linguistic
currency to which everyone has access". 8 Particularly for the most
oppressed in our society:
the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their
humanity ... rights imply a respect that places one in the referential range
of self and others, that elevates one's status from human body to social
being. 9
Just as women and slaves have used rights discourse to legitimate their
struggles, so now are prisoners, the homeless and people with disabilities.
Infertile women invoke rights discourse, in part by adopting a disabil-
ity label, and then use the language of equality to develop objectives of
individual autonomy. With this position, women who claim reproductive
disabilities have piggy-backed on a rights discourse that has provided
some limited success for the disability movement. Unlike the equality
concerns that inform the position taken by women with disabilities, this
approach to reproductive matters is based on considerations of liberty and
privacy.60 Although a rights analysis is infinitely elastic and is certainly
57. Rights discourse has been widely criticized as a set of legal concepts which articulates a
problem in a particular and limited way, obscuring the more important power relationships that
underlie disadvantage. For a discussion of the ways in which a discourse and especially the
discourse of law sets the boundaries for the discussion, see Carol Smart, Feminism and The
Power of Law (New York: Routledge, 1989). For instance, law distorts the issues of sexuality
that underlie rape and distorts the capitalist relations that underlay exploitation of women in
employment. Similarly, legal rights of mental patients provides a distraction from the power
of the psychiatric establishment to renderpatients powerless. A similarproblem exists because
of the discourse in which the debate on reproductive technology is set. With only a "yes-no"
alternative to the question of reproductive technology, the frame of the issue assumes that there
is only one feminist agenda related to reproductive rights. Clearly the right to have or not have
children, to accept orreject sterilization, to birth or raise children as part of a lesbian partnership
or as a single woman, are all matters within the struggle for reproductive rights. The particular
formulation of the agenda depends on all of the differences between women.
58. See Carol Smart, ibid
59. For a discussion of why rights are important to the most seriously oppressed groups in our
society, see Patricia Williams, "The Pain of Word Bondage" in The Alchemy of Race and
Rights, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at p. 153:
For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied
aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places one in the referential range
of self and others, that elevates one's status from human body to social being.
60. See Lynn Smith, "An Equality Approach to Reproductive Choice: R. v. Sullivan" (1991),
4 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1, who argues that the traditional view of reproductive
choice is based on an individual woman's "right to choose" about matters relating to
pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and medical treatment. An equality approach focuses on
the economic, social and cultural concerns of pregnancy, child-bearing and child-rearing.
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an imperfect tool for prediction, the rights argument advanced by infertile
women is not only compelling, but is likely to work because of a
particular combination: the use of "disability" as a symbolic underpin-
ning of the argument, the way the questions fit within current discussions
in the field of bioethics and the social position of the women who advance
the argument.6 What is important here is that the women likely to
advance rights arguments for the purpose of gaining access to reproduc-
tive technology are unlikely either to perceive themselves or to be
perceived by others as part of an oppressed class in any other way. In
advancing a claim to reproductive technology, some women are making
demands on an economic and political system that has served them
reasonably well, and these women can expect success, atleastin compari-
son to women with disabilities.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has looked at the ways in which rights, discourse is used to
respond to reproductive technology. The concept of "choice" is an
orienting point. As a sacrosanct component of feminist discourse on
matters of reproduction and sexuality, women who experience reproduc-
tive difficulties call on the right to choose motherhood and claim a
violation of the right when there is an obstacle to resources. The argument
for the entitlement to resources is buttressed by identifying with the
disability movement and by raising arguments framed in a medicalized
discourse.
To persons with disabilities, an abstract notion of a right to "choice"
is not helpful in explanation, nor is it true to life's experience. "Choice"
implies that an individual uses a particular calculus to decide and to affect
outcome. Through the living experience of disadvantage, women with
disabilities are sensitized to unravel a situation where it consists of false
choices. Pre-natal testing, presented as material on which to make better
and freer choices may be such a false choice. Women with disabilities
accept neither a medical model of disability nor the medicalization of the
debate about reproductive technology.
In the chimeric world of rights, disability rights activists use equality
rights to argue against reproductive technology. The focus is on discrimi-
nation and group concerns, most importantly, the eugenic component and
its connection to medicine. Women with fertility problems who wish
61. I would not suggest that the measure of success of the arguments should be so high a
standard as universally accessible state-funded treatment of choice for infertility: rather, I
suggest more limited private solutions to meet the requirements of the individual.
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access to resources have adopted the equality rights discourse, cloaked
with the right to medical treatment, in the service of individual autonomy.
Rights which are so compelling in our society, yet so devoid of content,
exist as an explanation within the power of law. Whether Ann, my client,
who had certain legal rights in her situation, was able to continue her
pregnancy (or was even allowed to be pregnant, despite the fact that she
was) or not was determined not by law, or even by arguments in law, but
by medical understanding, advice, and coercion to its patient Ann.
